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Abstract
In this paper, a formalization of Martin Seligman’s concept of full life is presented by
employing basic microeconomics. With the formalized version of the concept, it can be
explained why people differ with respect to the levels of pleasant, engaged and meaning-
ful life they are trying to realize. Moreover, it is suggested to extend Seligman’s concept
of full life to the concept of balanced life. This extension requires that in addition to
differences in people’s preferences regarding aspects of life also differences in the time
opportunity costs are to be taken into account. Finally, a scorecard-approach is pro-
posed to track personal advancement in the process of life balancing.
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The conceptualization of happiness is a difﬁcult endeavor. Recently, a large number of em-
pirical studies provide a basis for the analysis of subjective well-being via questionnaires.
Beside these positive studies focusing on self-reported happiness, however, there are also
normative studies as to what one should expect to make people really happy. The question
on the determinants of happiness is probably one of the oldest questions of mankind, as
can be seen from the answers that are provided e.g. by religion and philosophy. Nowadays,
there are also answers from psychology, namely positive psychology.
In this paper, we take a closer look at one of the answers given by this discipline of psychol-
ogy, Martin Seligman’s concept of full life. In our view, his approach is a very instructive
example of a normative concept of "objective" happiness in the sense that Seligman pre-
scribes the route to happiness. Although Seligman uses an amazing amount of the world’s
written cultural heritage to construct his concept, the result is nonetheless of a normative
nature insofar as it says how "objective" happiness may be attained. As a consequence,
Seligman’s concept may be seen as closer related to Aristotle’s good life than to today’s
hedonists’ happiness.
In its present form, Seligman’s concept is not formalized. In this paper, a formalization
and quantiﬁcation is attempted using basic microeconomic analysis. The objective of this
procedure is to clarify the implications of the concept by taking into account that people
face constraints when trying to make their lives more comfortable. The most fundamental
constraint is the time that is available. Therefore, we introduce a time constraint for people
pursuing their goals in life. We show the consequences this implies for the concept of
Seligman.
Our approach is an economic and a quantitative one. It is economic as it focuses on
decisions about the allocation of resources. It is quantitative as the amount of time spent
on the different "routes" to happiness is measured. As we will show in the second section,
1the attempt to quantify ethical reasoning is not completely new. In addition to that, more
recent research on happiness in the social sciences is to a large extent quantitative and
based on survey data. This encourages us to formalize and quantify Seligman’s concept.
However, formalization and quantiﬁcation must lead to insights that might not be gained
without them. Hence, new insights will be the criterion upon which the usefulness of
the approach adopted here is to be judged. In the third section, Seligman’s concept of
full life is introduced and characterized. Its formalization and quantiﬁcation is carried
out and analyzed in the fourth section. The ﬁfth section contains a scorecard concept to
empower people to track their personal route to happiness. The scorecard is interpreted
as a transformation of Seligman’s full life into the measurable balanced life concept. The
sixth section concludes.
2 Formalization in ethical and happiness research
Perhaps the ﬁrst formalization of an ethical concept can be found in Hutcheson (1725). The
attempt "to compute the Morality of any Actions, with all their Circumstances" (Hutcheson,
1725) led him to the formula (Hutcheson, 1725, ﬁrst variant):
M = (B + S)  A = BA + SA (1)





with the following notation: M = moment of (public) good, B = virtue of the agent or benev-
olence, S = self-love, A = abilities, I = moment of private good or interest. Hence, the
last equation says that the virtue of an agent may be calculated as the public good he or
she provides minus the private good he or she produces for himself or herself, and this
difference divided by the abilities of the respective person.
Of course, it is very easy to criticize this formula as well as the whole idea and approach
2(see e.g. Bredvold, 1951); but nevertheless the approach was insofar successful as it trig-
gered over the centuries new methods to discuss normative as well as analytical questions.
With respect to happiness, the formal approach was taken up by F.Y. Edgeworth (1879)
as hedonical calculus or utilitarian calculus (Edgeworth, 1881). In his famous deﬁnition it
reads as follows: "Greatest possible happiness is the greatest possible integral of the differ-
ential ’Number of enjoyers  duration of enjoyment  degree thereof’ "(Edgeworth, 1881)
which is formalized as the maximal value of
Z Z Z
dpdndt (4)
"(where dp corresponds to a just perceivable increment of pleasure, dn to a sentient indi-
vidual, dt to an instant of time)" (Edgeworth, 1881).
About 100 years later, new attempts to formalizations and quantiﬁcations of happiness are
undertaken. According to Lykken (2000) happiness consists of an individual happiness
baseline which is determined by genetic and (temporarily) by physiological constitution.
Deviations from this baseline are created by recent events and the individual’s activities to
inﬂuence its happiness. Norrish, Vella-Brodrick (2008) deduced from these considerations
the formula
H = S + C + V:
Happiness (H) is the sum of three factors: the individual’s happiness set point or baseline
(S), the individual’s circumstances (C) and voluntary factors controlled by the individual
(V) (Cf. Fig. ??). This formula has been studied empirically by Lyubomirsky, Sheldon and
Schkade (2005) to explicate the determinants of happiness and to quantify them. They
showed that the happiness set point (S) contributes 50% to the explanation of individual
happiness whereas only 10% are contributed by life circumstances (C) and as much as
40% by intentional activities (V) (Lyubomirsky/Sheldon/Schkade, 2005).












with hij as the amount of time individual i is engaged in activity j; ij is the net affective
experience during activity j and N the size of the population (Kahneman et al., 2004a).
Measuring hij by its average value Hj and ij by its average value uj, assuming that there
exists no correlation across people between the time spent on an activity and its net affect,
leads to the equation for WB’ above. The net affect of activities might be taken from the
Day Reconstruction Method (DRM) of Kahneman et al. (2004b) and could be combined with
time use data from Time Use Surveys (Kahneman et al., 2004a). Hence, well-being even on
a national level might become measurable.
As it seems, there is at least some agreement among researchers on happiness issues that
it is reasonable to formalize and to quantify concepts and aspects of happiness (Kahne-
man/Krueger, 2006). But nevertheless there are limits to such an approach. Perhaps the
most important limitation is the measurability of both, happiness and its determinants.
Happiness as well as its determinants are rather fuzzy and vague concepts which may
mean different things to different people (Schwarz/Strack, 1999). If this is true, it becomes
very difﬁcult to compare or even to aggregate levels of happiness. Neither formalization
nor quantiﬁcation can solve this problem. This implies that quantitative results need a
careful interpretation. However, in our opinion it does not mean that formalization and
quantiﬁcation are futile.
43 Seligman’s routes to happiness
In the scientiﬁc happiness literature, different concepts co-exist. One prominent posi-
tion from positive psychology is credited to Martin Seligman. In the following, this so-
called "Seligman approach" (Vittersø/Oelmann/Wang, forthcoming) is presented. In this
approach, happiness is deﬁned as a multidimensional goal that can be attained via three
different routes (Seligman, 2002; Seligman/Rashid/Parks, 2006) that might be dubbed
"Seligman’s trinity": pleasant life, engaged life and meaningful life (see also Figure ??).
These routes correspond to the three ethical theories of self-interest told apart by Parﬁt
(1984). The ﬁrst one is based on hedonistic theories of happiness, the second is an off-
spring of desire theory and the third may be connected to objective list theories (Selig-
man/Royzman, 2003).1
- Insert Figure 1 about here -
The ﬁrst route to happiness is the pleasant life, "a life that successfully pursues the positive
emotions about the present, past and future" (Seligman, 2002; Seligman, 2003). This
concept is backed by the hedonistic idea of a life full of bodily and higher pleasures. Bodily
pleasures are those momentary positive emotions that are induced by sensual perceptions.
The so-called higher pleasures are pleasures that can be reached in more complicated and
more cultivated ways (Seligman, 2002; Seligman, 2003). The pleasant life, thus, refers
to the philosophical theory of hedonism, the concentration on the pursuit of pleasures.
Exempliﬁed is this hedonism by the utilitarian theory of Jeremy Bentham who deﬁnes
happiness as the sum of pleasures over time, the amount of which is to be maximized.2
The second route to happiness is an engaged life (Seligman/Rashid/Parks, 2006).3 An en-
1It is noteworthy that the economist John C. Harsanyi had a somewhat similar concept of the ingredients of individual
utility functions; see Harsanyi (1986, 1995, 1997). For the relationship between utility, informed preferences and happiness
in Harsanyi’s concept see Ng (1999).
2See above for Edgeworth’s formalization of this idea. For a more comprehensive overview of the history of utility
theory see Read (2007) and the literature quoted there. While Ho (2006) puts emphasis on the diﬀerences between utility
and happiness, Kimball and Willis (2006) suggest a way for reconciliation of these concepts.
3In some of his works Seligman uses the expression "good life" for this route, e. g. Seligman (2002) and Seligman
(2004).
5gaged life consists of "using your strengths and virtues to obtain abundant gratiﬁcation in
the main realms of life" (Seligman, 2003). This can be achieved by a person by developing
her strengths and virtues. Seligman and his colleagues differentiate these characteristics in
their VIA (Values in Action) classiﬁcation into 24 character strengths (Peterson/Seligman,
2004; Park/Peterson/Seligman, 2004; Peterson/Park/Seligman, 2005a). Albeit other au-
thors use different classiﬁcations they seem to agree on a certain canon of core virtues.
In the philosophical tradition, this corresponds to a (neo-)Aristotelian approach in which a
happy life means a virtuous life.4 This road to happiness also corresponds to the concept
of ﬂow developed by Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi (2002).5 Flow is "the state in which people are
so involved in an activity that nothing else seems to matter" (Csikszentmihalyi, 2002). To
achieve a high degree of engagement, according to Seligman and colleagues it is promising
to identify the individual’s central strengths, his "signature strengths" (Seligman, 2002;
Peterson/Seligman, 2004).
A meaningful life is the third route to happiness (Seligman/Parks/Steen, 2005). A life is
called meaningful if its aim is based on a higher purpose than the person itself. Such ends
consist of a variety of "positive institutions" (Seligman/Rashid/Parks, 2006) as for instance
religion, politics, family, community or nation (Seligman/Rashid/Parks, 2006). Seligman
relates the concept of the meaningful life to the ethical "objective list" theories. These
theories presume that there are certain universal objectives to be desired by all human
beings (if they only knew what is best for themselves), may these universal values spring
from anthropological necessities or from religious revelations.
Seligman (2002) states that to follow simultaneously all three routes to happiness is the
best way to achieve the ultimate goal of "authentic happiness", i.e. a full life. According
to Seligman this full life "consists in experiencing positive emotions about the past and
future, savoring positive feelings from the pleasures, deriving abundant gratiﬁcations from
your signature strengths, and using these strengths in the service of something larger to
4Cf. e. g. the perfectionistic approach of Thomas Hurka or Martha Nussbaum’s capabilities approach. See also
Kraut, 2008; McMahon, 2004.
5Describing happiness as a feeling of ﬂow is much older and goes back at least to the Greek philosopher Epiktet. See
Hudson, 1996.
6obtain meaning." (Seligman, 2002.) In this way the whole is more than the sum of its parts.
In contrast to that, an empty life - a life low on all three dimensions - is even poorer than
the sum of those three levels reached would indicate (Peterson/Park/Seligman, 2005b).
Seligman (2002) qualiﬁes his concept of full life by adding that the different routes are
not of equal importance for the actualization of a full life: Following the route of a pleas-
ant life is judged signiﬁcantly less important than that of a engaged or a meaningful life
(Seligman, 2002; Peterson/Park/Seligman, 2005b). To sum up, there are three routes to
happiness that have to be taken simultaneously to achieve a full life; however, an engaged
and meaningful life is considered more important than a pleasant one.
4 Formalization and modiﬁcation of the full life concept
4.1 Analytics of ’full life’
In this section, Seligman’s concept of full life is put into a formal model and modiﬁed by
doing so.
In the language of economics, the subjective evaluation of activities is called utility. Denote
the amount of pleasure in life by p, the amount of engaged life activities with e and the
amount of meaningful life activities with m, the general utility of these activities may be
written as U(p;e;m). This formalization is, however, too unspeciﬁc to be useful. Following
Seligman, a full life requires that all three routes to happiness have to be taken to a certain
extent. Hence, a full life requires that all activities p;e and m are essential, i.e. U(0;e;m) =
U(p;0;m) = U(p;e;0) = 0. This implies that the lack of a whole category of activities nulliﬁes
happiness. However, even this assumption is not fully sufﬁcient since it implies that a very
small amount of activities in one category might be sufﬁcient. To avoid this implication,
deﬁne by p;e;m the minimally required amount of activities for a decent life in the respective
7category. We call these minimal quantities of activities basic needs.6 For p < p or e < e or
m < m, i.e. if the basic needs are not met, utility or happiness U is rendered null.
Furthermore, it is assumed that the categories of activities may differ in their relevance for
happiness or full life. Let therefore ;; 2 (0;1) be the weights of (in this order) p;e;m in
the utility function with ++ = 1. These weights represent attitudes and may represent
aspects of an individual’s personality. Furthermore, it seems not unrealistic that these
weights of preferences are more or less inﬂuenced by the predominant life-styles of the
respective peer groups in a society.
According to these assumptions, the utility function might be speciﬁed as follows:
U(p;e;m) := (p   p)(e   e)(m   m): (6)
Note that this is a Stone-Geary utility function (Samuelson, 1947/48; Geary, 1949/50;
Stone, 1954). In the case of p = e = m = 0, a Cobb-Douglas utility function would result.
A Stone-Geary kind of utility function sufﬁces to represent Seligman’s full life concept in a
formalized way.
Note further that in the original concept of Seligman it is required that all three arguments
are incorporated in the utility function. However, the formal approach taken in this paper
allows in general that one (or even two) of the weights (;;) might be equal to zero.
This would not result in a utility of zero because U(p;e;m) := (p   p)(e   e)(m   m)0 =
U(p;e) = (p   p)(e   e) with  +  = 1. In contrast to that, it does not make sense to deﬁne
minimum requirements for activities whose weight in the utility function is zero. Hence, in
accordance with Seligman, we assume that all weights are larger than zero.






U(p;e;m) > 0; (7)
6An alternative interpretation could be that these minimal quantities are life goals (in the sense of Headey, 2008).












U(p;e;m) > 0: (9)
When choosing among alternatives, several restrictions are to be taken into account. The
most important restriction is time. All activities require a certain amount of time that is
not available for other activities. I.e. all activities have positive opportunity costs. Insofar
the time constraint is the most general restriction in human life. Consider e.g. pleasurable
goods that cost some money. To earn this money, a certain amount of time must be used in
the labor market. Hence, all monetary costs are in this sense opportunity costs of time. Let
the time cost of pleasurable activities be tp, of engaged life activities te and of meaningful
life activities tm. The total amount of time available be T. Then the time constraint of an
individual can be written as:
T  tpp + tee + tmm: (10)
For T > tpp + tee + tmm, the time constraint is not binding, i.e. there is time left that can be
used freely. However, in the following we restrict ourselves to binding time constraints.7
Up to this point, the formalization was carried out as a formal representation of Seligman’s
concept. However, the model may also be connected with Hutcheson (1725) and Lykken
(1999): the abilities of a person may be represented by individual time costs for p;e;m
whereas genetic factors may have an impact on the minimum values of p;e;m as well as on
the weights ;; of the utility function. For instance, a person with a talent for pleasurable
activities will have low time costs per unit of this activity compared to an untalented person.
A similar argument holds for all activities in the utility function.
Assume now that a person tries to realize full life, given the time constraint and the time
costs of the respective activities. Formally, this means that the utility function is to be
7A binding time constraint is often felt as time stress. For an international empirical analysis of time stress see
Hamermesh and Lee (2003).
9maximized for p;e;m with respect to the time constraint:
max
p;e;mU(p;e;m) = (p   p)(e   e)(m   m) w.r.t. T = tpp + tee + tmm: (11)
Let  be the Lagrange coefﬁcient of the time constraint. The ﬁrst-order conditions for an
interior utility maximum are:

p   p
U(p;e;m)   tp = 0; (12)

e   e
U(p;e;m)   te = 0; (13)

m   m
U(p;e;m)   tm = 0: (14)











The condition requires that the marginal utilities of activities, divided by their respective
time opportunity costs, are to be equalized. Note, however, that a precondition for an inte-
rior solution of the mathematical program is that the minimal activities p;e;m are already
carried out. Given that they are, it is worth to bear in mind that the preference param-
eters ;; in connection with the time opportunity costs tp;te;tm determine the optimal
quantities of activities. This implies that not all persons will choose the same quantities
of activities in the respective categories when trying to realize a full life. Observing that
different persons spend different amounts of time with the respective activities does not
necessarily imply that they have different preferences or that they are misguided in their
behavior. Therefore, it seems more precise to say that people will try to balance their lives
with respect to their preferences as well as with respect to their abilities and their time
10restrictions.
To complete the formal analysis, note that the demand functions for the respective activities
p;e;m are given by:
p = (1   )p +

tp
[T   (tee + tmm)]; (16)
e = (1   )e +

te
[T   (tpp + tmm)]; (17)
m = (1   )m +

tm
[T   (tpp + tee)]: (18)
The demand functions show that the demand of a particular activity is guided by the
preference strengths (;;) and the respective time opportunity cost, multiplied by the
time left over after the minimally necessary activities are provided (time surplus).
The demand functions can be used to quantify the time elasticities of the respective activity
categories. By doing this the time opportunity costs of the respective activity are interpreted
as ’prices’ for that activity. The own-’price’ and cross-’price’ elasticities of the demand for
pleasant life are quantiﬁed reactions of the allocation of time with respect to changes of the
time-opportunity costs of the activity in question. These elasticities are especially relevant
for measuring empirically the intensity of preferences for the respective activities. For
Stone-Geary utility functions the own-’price’ and cross-’price’ elasticities of the demand for






















































































Note that all own-’price’ elasticities as well as all cross-’price’ elasticities are smaller than
zero. This means that the activities are complements for each other given that the basic
needs in each category are already met. Furthermore, the demand of the respective activity
declines if the time opportunity costs of this activity or the minimally required amounts
of the other activities increase. In addition to that, an increase in the opportunity costs
of the other activities also reduces the amount of the activity in question. Resulting from
the necessary minimum requirements on all three routes to happiness this shows that an
engaged or meaningful life cannot be substituted by a pleasant life.
Finally, a short remark on the static nature of the model is necessary. According to East-
12erlin (2006) and Thomas/Stock (1988) the determinants of individual happiness over the
life cycle might change. In the model presented here, the dynamics could be incorporated
by introducing time-dependent preference parameters ();();() whereby  2 [0;] is
the time of life from birth ( = 0) to death ( = ). In addition to that, the opportunity costs
of time may also depend on the life cycle, i.e. tp();tg();tm(). If people are not perfectly
rational, it is reasonable to assume that they try to maximize their level of happiness in-
dependently for each  2 [0;], i.e. for each period of life. Hence, the conditions derived in
this paper do not change; the only difference would be that one had to add time subscripts
to the optimal values, i.e. p
;g
;m
, whereby an asterisk means the optimal value of the
choice variable. Rethinking the allocation of time and effort from time to time would lead
to discrete adjustments of the optimal values to preference changes and changes of the
opportunity costs.
4.2 Balancing life
As already said at the beginning of the section, Seligman’s approach is not only formalized
in this paper but also modiﬁed. To see this, the results of the formal analysis will be
interpreted in the following.
The most important result of the formal analysis is that not only the personal preferences
for a pleasurable, engaged and meaningful life are decisive but also the individual oppor-
tunity costs of time. Observable differences in the behavior of people are not only based
on different (or even ’false’) preferences, but also on different time costs. For a personal
optimum, the marginal increases of satisfaction due to the respective activity divided by
its time costs are equalized. For this reason we say that balancing one’s life should be the
ultimate objective in Seligman’s concept.
Balancing life is difﬁcult if the time costs for providing the material necessities of life are
very high (as it is in less developed countries). As long as a certain level of economic
13development is not yet attained, it might be impossible for a large part of the population to
aim higher at engaging and meaningful life activities which require surplus time. The latter
may be interpreted with respect to the inﬂuence of economic development on the pursuit
of happiness: Economic progress gives people more free time in the sense that the material
basis of life is quicker established and, hence, more time is left over for other activities than
earning a living. Consequently, people gain more time for a happy life.
Furthermore, balancing a life is not feasible in absolute deprivation. The approach taken
here enables us to deﬁne three kinds of absolute deprivation (see Duclos/Grégoire, 2002,
for a general deﬁnition) in a society: A person is deprived if she or he is unable to meet
the basic needs concerning (1) hedonistic life goals, (2) concerning activities aimed at an
engaged and (3) a meaningful life. As a consequence, her or his full life index would be
equal to zero. Furthermore, in this case the ﬁrst-order conditions for the optimal alloca-
tion of time are not valid and the demand functions presented above do not hold, too. It
seems noteworthy that the full life concept of absolute deprivation is broader than con-
cepts that are based solely on income or consumption. According to the former concept, a
person might be absolutely deprived if she or he is unable to meet her or his basic needs
concerning engaging and meaningful life activities by being at the same time rich with re-
spect to income or consumption. In afﬂuent societies, this could be the prevalent form of
absolute deprivation since the material basis for a full life is by and large granted by the
welfare state. However, the welfare state does neither have the ability nor the instruments
to provide the bare necessities for an engaged and meaningful life.
Moreover, a person is relatively deprived (see Duclos/Grégoire, 2002, for a general deﬁni-
tion) if her or his level of well-being (as measured by U(p;e;m)) is lower than that of the
’signiﬁcant others’ in her or his peer-group. A person might experience relative deprivation
even if she or he has the same income and social status as her or his signiﬁcant others be-
cause of lacking an engaged and meaningful life. Again, the full life concept seems broader
than other approaches.
14A further aspect of balancing life is the phenomenon of time stress in rich societies. It is
generally acknowledged that there exists a positive relationship between leisure and quality
of life; see e.g. Lloyd and Auld (2002), Iwasaki (2007) as well as Rodríguez, Látková and
Sun (2008). Using a survey method to characterize the affects of daily life experiences, it
was shown that the least positive affects were generated by housework, work and com-
muting (Kahneman et al., 2004a). The crucial question is, then, why do people work so
much in rich societies. According to the optimality results derived above it was to be ex-
pected that working time will decline as a society grows richer. This tendency is actually
observable (Greenwood/Vandenbroucke, 2005); however, there is also empirical evidence
that especially richer people suffer from time stress (Hamermesh/Lee, 2003). These em-
pirical results in connection with the optimality conditions above may be interpreted as if
people fail to behave in their own best interest. Put differently, not all persons seem to be
able to balance their lives. The psychic and social mechanisms behind this phenomenon
are not entirely clear, but at the core of it seems to be a kind of harmful status competi-
tion via conspicuous consumption (Veblen, 1899; Rauscher, 1997; Layard, 2006). In the
ﬁnal analysis, externalities of a dysfunctional social norm might be diagnosed as the main
culprit for this fallacy on the route to happiness. For the formal analysis above this would
mean that the preference parameters ;; are not the preferences a person would choose
for herself, but rather represent social norms. It is presumably the pleasant life that is
overvalued in today’s society (that is e.g. called ’Spaßgesellschaft’ in German).
5 The Balanced Happiness Scorecard (BHSC)
In this section, a scorecard approach is taken to make balancing of life measurable. It
is intended to adapt the concept of the balanced scorecard (BSC) to the concept of a Bal-
anced Happiness scorecard (BHSC).8 The original concept of BSC attempts to measure the
8There are, of course, other approaches to use the Balanced Scorecard concept as a tool for happiness management; see,
e. g., Schreiner (2005) or Rampersad (2006). These approaches diﬀer substantially from our’s. While Schreiner focuses
on the happiness of a community we look at happiness on the level of an individual. With respect to Rampersad, our
main intention is not to give practical advice but to exemplify the possibility of making Seligman’s concept measurable.
15performance of a ﬁrm with respect to its objectives that are based on the ﬁrm’s vision and
strategy (Kaplan and Norton, 1992, 1993, 1996). Of course, the original BSC seems not well
suited for an immediate application to happiness. However, as the theoretical analysis in
the preceding section shows it is not unrealistic to suppose that persons have ideas about
their levels of basic needs according to the categories of pleasant, engaged and meaningful
lives as well as about their goal levels with respect to those categories of happiness they
are striving for.
The technique of the BHSC suggested here is intended to enable people to make the pursuit
of happiness more conscious and to enable them to track their success in doing so. To this
end, it is proposed to encourage people to set for themselves goals for their basic needs as
well as for the level of performance they want for the particular happiness categories of a
pleasant, engaged and meaningful life.
The ﬁrst practical step is to set up an individual list of activities, classiﬁed as belonging
to a pleasant, an engaged and a meaningful life. At the second step, the minimum level
for each of these categories has to be speciﬁed. Having done this, the scorecard can be
used to measure regularly (say, each week or month) the level realized in comparison to
the level strived for. Checking for the difference between the levels realized and the levels
attempted empowers people to reallocate their available time in order to reach a higher
level of happiness.
- Insert Figure 2 about here -
The concept may be clariﬁed by Fig. ??. In this ﬁgure, the three axes represent quan-
titatively the levels of activities according to Seligman’s full life concept. The bottom line
deﬁnes the basic needs with respect to a pleasant, engaged and meaningful life. The next
line connects the levels in each happiness category that is strived for. It deﬁnes the goals
of a person, given her or his preferences and time resources as well as opportunity costs of
time. In addition to these two lines, a third line is drawn that represents the realized levels
of the person. Comparing the attempted levels with the realized ones is an indicator for
16the performance of a person with respect to the own happiness goals. In addition to that,
the differences between the strived for levels and the realized levels are an indicator for the
reallocation of time resources. In Fig. ??, the realized level of pleasantness is too high in
comparison to the attempted levels of a pleasant, engaged and meaningful life. A realloca-
tion of time resources from activities of a pleasant life to an engaged and meaningful life
seems to be called for.
6 Conclusions
The intention of this paper was to analyze economically Seligman’s concept of full life.
Rational choice theory is employed to formalize the concept by letting persons maximize
a utility function with respect to the opportunity costs of time for activities that belong
to three happiness categories. The utility function was speciﬁed in such a way that it
incorporates basic needs as well as preference parameters for the three areas of happiness
pointed out by Seligman. The chosen speciﬁcation is a well-known Stone-Geary type of
utility function.
Using this framework from microeconomics, it is shown that people have ﬁrst of all to
meet their basic needs whatever their time constraints may be. This explains quite easily
why economic development is not only wealth increasing, but also welfare and happiness
enhancing: Becoming richer means becoming more productive, and this implies that less
time is necessary to meet basic needs. Thus more time can be used for happiness and
welfare upgrading activities.
A further implication of Seligman’s theory is that more material wealth does not necessarily
lead to more happiness. While more wealth may be easily transformed in a more pleasant
life (via higher spending an consumer goods), it is not so easy to use it for a more engaged
and more meaningful life. The economic interpretation of Seligman’s concept shows that
the time opportunity costs are crucial in this respect. The more time is used for earning
17money to buy additional goods the less time is available for the activities of an engaged
and meaningful life. The result of Hamermesh and Lee (2003) - people with higher incomes
perceive more time stress for the same amount of working time than people with lower
incomes - may be interpreted along these lines. For those people it would be better to
use less time for work (and earning less) and to reallocate their time to activities that are
directly related to an engaged and meaningful life.
In addition to the formalization and analysis of Seligman’s concept, a new tool for measur-
ing individual performance with respect to happiness is presented in form of the Balanced
Happiness Scorecard. It is assumed that people are able to quantify relatively their levels of
utility from activities and that they know to a certain extent their preferences for activities.
People should then be able to quantify the level of their basic needs as well as the levels
of a pleasant, engaged and meaningful life they are striving for. These target goals can
be compared to the realized activity levels during a certain period of time, e.g. a week or
month. Putting the relevant values into the BHSC would allow people to check whether
they are achieving their goals and if not, in which direction they should reallocate their
time.
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